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Explaining the diversity of motivations behind community renewable energy 
Thomas Bauwens 
Abstract 
Community-based renewable energy initiatives may be important actors in the transition toward 
low-carbon energy systems. In turn, stimulating investments in renewable energy production at 
the community level requires a better understanding of investors’ motives. This paper aims to 
study the heterogeneity of motivations that drive individuals to participate in community 
renewable energy projects and the underlying explanatory factors behind this, as well as the 
implications for their level of engagement in initiatives. Based on quantitative data from an 
original survey conducted with two renewable energy cooperatives in Flanders, the statistical 
analysis shows that cooperative members should not be considered as one homogeneous group. 
Several categories of members with different motives and levels of engagement can be 
distinguished. This heterogeneity is explained by contrasts in terms of institutional settings, 
spatial patterns and attitudes to the diffusion of institutional innovations. Regarding policy 
implications, the findings suggest that this heterogeneity should be taken into account in 
designing more effective supporting policies to stimulate investments at the community level. 
The activation of social norms is also shown to be a promising mechanism for triggering 
investment decisions, although the implications of its interplay with economic incentives should 
be further explored. 
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1. Introduction 
The limits faced by energy systems with respect to the depletion of fossil fuels and climate 
change are today widely recognised and make a transition from fossil resources to a low-carbon 
society necessary. Aside from other measures such as efficiency improvements, this transition will 
most likely require the displacement of fossil fuels by various renewable energy (RE) sources 
(Smil, 2010), all the more since several countries have announced decisions to abandon nuclear 
power following the 2011 Fukushima Daiichi disaster in Japan (Schneider et al., 2011). 
The challenges ahead are enormous. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change estimates 
that the global cumulative RE investments needed to achieve atmospheric greenhouse gas 
concentration stabilisation will range from 2,850 to 12,280 billion USD (valued in 2005 prices) 
for the period 2011-20301 (IPCC, 2011). Governments alone are unable to achieve investments 
of this magnitude (Wüstenhagen and Menichetti, 2012). The support of other RE investors and 
producers is necessary, including business organisations, households and civil society actors, and 
therefore a better understanding of these are needed. In this perspective, community renewable 
energy (CRE) initiatives seem promising. The concept of ‘community energy’ describes formal or 
informal citizen-led initiatives which propose collaborative solutions on a local basis to facilitate 
the development of sustainable energy technologies and practices (Bauwens et al., 2016; Seyfang 
et al., 2013; Walker and Devine-Wright, 2008). Gaining a better insight on the motivations of RE 
investors at the community level can help decision makers design more effective supporting 
policies to address these communities.  
Recent research has explored the factors that influence participation in CRE projects (Bamberg et 
al., 2015; Dóci and Vasileiadou, 2015; Kalkbrenner and Roosen, 2016), but without significant or 
systematic investigation of the reasons why different types of members may have distinct 
                                                          
1
 The lower values refer to the International Energy Agency World Energy Outlook 2009 Reference Scenario 
and the higher values to a scenario that seeks to stabilise atmospheric CO2 concentrations at 450 ppm. 
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motivations to join these initiatives.  The analysis of actual members’ level of engagement has 
also been neglected in previous studies.  
In response to these research gaps, the objective of this paper is to empirically investigate the 
potential heterogeneity among members of CRE initiatives in terms of their motivations, and the 
underlying explanatory factors behind this. Further, it analyses the influence of this heterogeneity 
on members’ level of engagement in projects. Following recent research on the heterogeneity of 
RE investors (Bergek et al., 2013; Mignon and Bergek, 2016), this paper specifically looks at 
institutional and innovation diffusion dimensions to explain why investors may have 
heterogeneous motives at the community level. It also examines the roles of spatial patterns as an 
additional explanatory factor. The influences of these factors have never been studied jointly. 
Drawing upon the comparative analysis of two RE cooperatives, BeauVent and Ecopower, 
located in Flanders, the paper uses data from an original survey conducted among the members 
of these two organisations. Correlation analyses and statistical tests are performed to study 
cooperative members’ motivations and level of engagement. Despite common features, the two 
cooperatives studied differ in a crucial way: in addition to producing RE, Ecopower also supplies 
electricity, while BeauVent is a production cooperative only and does not undertake any supply 
activities. Due to these different positions in the energy value chain, the two organisations 
present distinct institutional characteristics which, in turn, shape different incentive structures for 
potential and existing cooperative members. As a result, the analysis reveals clear differences 
among cooperative members in terms of motivations, both within and across organisations. This 
heterogeneity is also reflected in their level of engagement. In addition to institutional aspects, the 
spatial localisation of the groups of members and their attitudes to the diffusion of social 
innovations (Rogers, 1995) are shown to reinforce the differences among them. 
By providing a fine-grained analysis of the factors that influence the heterogeneity of participants 
in CRE initiatives, the results can inform policy-makers and CRE managers for the development 
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of effective strategies to encourage active participation and financial investments at the 
community level. 
The article is structured as follows. Section 2 provides the theoretical framework on which the 
empirical work is grounded. Section 3 presents the methodology used and Section 4 analyses the 
collected data. Then, Section 5 discusses the findings, while Section 6 concludes and suggests 
some implications for policy-makers and for future research. 
2. Theoretical framework 
2.1. The roles of community-based initiatives in speeding up the diffusion of 
RE technologies 
CRE initiatives are typically characterised by a high degree of community involvement in the 
ownership, management and benefits of projects (Walker and Devine-Wright, 2008). RE 
cooperatives, as a specific form of CRE schemes, enable citizens to collectively own and manage 
RE projects at the local level. Through this model, citizens produce, invest in and, in some cases, 
consume RE. The following cooperative principles, adopted by the International Co-operative 
Alliance (ICA, 1995), are common to all types of cooperatives around the world: a voluntary and 
open membership, democratic member control (e.g. a ‘one person-one vote’ rule), economic 
participation by members, autonomy and independence, education, training and information, 
cooperation among cooperatives, and concern for the community. In addition, only a limited 
remuneration of the capital subscribed is permitted in cooperatives, which suggests that profit 
maximisation is not the main objective.  
CRE initiatives in general and RE cooperatives in particular are increasingly perceived as 
potential key actors in the transition toward low-carbon energy systems (e.g. Boon and 
Dieperink, 2014; Yalçın-Riollet et al., 2014). Indeed, it has been argued that the participation of 
citizens in benefits and decision-making processes of RE projects may increase levels of societal 
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acceptability of renewables, especially in the case of onshore (Bauwens, 2015; Maruyama et al., 
2007) and offshore wind farms (Walker et al., 2014). Comparative research has shown that a high 
degree of citizen involvement in wind energy projects is positively correlated with high 
deployment rates (Bauwens et al., 2016; Toke et al., 2008). In the same perspective, while 
Mumford and Gray (2010) show evidence of a lack of trust from the public in conventional 
energy actors as far as the deployment of alternative energy in the UK is concerned, the 
implementation of decentralised RE installations need to be steered by trustworthy individuals 
and organisations rooted in local communities (Eyre, 2013; Walker et al., 2010).  
Community participation in RE deployment is also an important condition for success in 
financing the transformation of energy systems. CRE initiatives have substantially contributed to 
RE deployment in several countries. In Denmark, over 150,000 households contributed to wind 
power financing as members of wind power cooperatives in 2002, and more than 80% of the 
installed wind turbines were owned by wind power cooperatives and single owners (Bauwens et 
al., 2016). Similarly, 46% of the total installed RE capacity in Germany in 2012 was owned by 
individuals, farmers or CRE initiatives (trend:research Gmb and Leuphana Universität; Yildiz et 
al., 2015).  
2.2. Motivations to join and engage with CRE initiatives 
Two types of decisions are considered in this section: on the one hand, members’ decisions to 
join CRE initiatives in the first place, and, on the other hand, their level of engagement. 
Engagement is defined in terms of the volume of financial investment made and the degree of 
participation in the governance of organisations. It is argued hereafter that both types of decision 
are influenced by two broad categories of motivation: ‘self-regarding’ motives and social or moral 
norms. 
Research into households’ investments in RE production from a standard economic perspective 
commonly shares the assumption that individuals are purely ‘self-regarding’, i.e. they only care 
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about their own material payoff. It follows that households will invest in RE microgeneration 
systems if the expected return of the investment, in the form of avoided electricity imports and 
therefore reduced electricity bills, balances or exceeds its upfront capital cost (Bergman and Eyre, 
2011; Sauter and Watson, 2007).  
Socio-psychological research and behavioural approaches in economics have contested this 
simplistic vision of individuals. In general, people are not purely self-regarding, but also follow 
social or moral norms2 of behaviour backed up by emotions such as pride, guilt, shame and anger 
(Bowles and Gintis, 2009). Norms are ‘customary rules of behaviour that coordinate our 
interactions with others. Once a particular way of doing things becomes established as a rule, it 
continues in force because we prefer to conform to the rule given the expectation that others are 
going to conform’ (Young, 2008: 647). The roles of norms have gained increasing attention in the 
literature on RE investments. For instance, Mignon and Bergek (2016) report that some people 
invest in renewable electricity production to conform to the behaviour of peers and to gain 
acceptance and recognition. Other studies analyse the roles of social interactions and peer effect 
processes in the decisions and intentions to adopt photovoltaic systems (Bollinger and 
Gillingham, 2012; McEachern and Hanson, 2008; Noll et al., 2014).  
The objective here is not to challenge the idea that members of CRE initiatives may partially act 
based on self-regarding calculations. Some incentives, such as the return on the investment in 
share(s) or cheap electricity prices, rely on self-regarding motives. Nonetheless, material 
incentives may not be the only type of motivations for members of CRE initiatives. Recent 
research shows that different social or moral norms play a role as well. Following Kalkbrenner 
and Roosen (2016), the norms considered are environmental concern, interpersonal trust and 
social identification. 
                                                          
2
 It is difficult to draw the line between socially- and morally-driven behaviours, both empirically and 
conceptually, because norms are never completely independent of the social context (Dubreuil and Grégoire, 
2013). Therefore, for sake of simplicity, no distinction is made between social and moral norms in subsequent 
analysis and the term ‘norms’ refers to both types. 
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First, individuals may join these initiatives because they care for the environment and want to 
encourage RE production. In this perspective, different studies show that environmental concern 
has a positive effect on pro-environmental behaviour in general (e.g. Fraj and Martinez, 2006) 
and on the willingness to participate in CRE projects in particular (Dóci and Vasileiadou, 2015; 
Kalkbrenner and Roosen, 2016). A second factor of interest is interpersonal trust, understood as 
mirroring an expectation of trustworthiness. Much of the literature on community-based 
management of natural resources argues that trust is an essential ingredient for building highly 
cohesive and cooperative communities (e.g. Ostrom, 2003). Similarly, the literature on CRE 
shows that these initiatives are typically characterised by a high degree of interpersonal trust 
(Walker et al., 2010). Third, social identification, i.e. the perception of belonging to some human 
aggregate, is also likely to play a role. The socio-psychological literature on collective action 
shows that a strong social identification to a group fosters cooperative behaviours (Tyler and 
Blader, 2001). This result is supported by extensive evidence from experimental settings and the 
field (Brown-Kruse and Hummels, 1993; Dawes et al., 1988; Goette et al., 2006). For instance, 
Stürmer and Kampmeier (2003) highlight the importance of group identification as a determinant 
of community volunteerism and local participation, relying on experimental and field data. In the 
same perspective, social influences such as advice from trusted individuals in people’s direct 
social network (colleagues, neighbours, friends, relatives, etc.) may matter as well. For instance, a 
survey conducted among the members of the cooperative Ecopower shows that almost 30% of 
members came to know of the organisation by word of mouth (Ecopower, 2013). 
That being said, the relative importance of self-regarding motives and norm-driven behaviours 
depends on several factors. First, the institutional context within which members of CRE 
projects interact is likely to play a role. Indeed, recent studies emphasise the role of institutions as 
important factors for understanding the heterogeneity of RE investors (Bergek et al. 2013; 
Mignon and Bergek, 2016). Generally defined, institutions refer to the formal and informal rules 
that shape and structure the interactions between people within collective settings (families, local 
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communities, markets, business organisations, etc.) (Ostrom, 2005). They constrain the actions 
and strategies adopted by individuals, the information they obtain, the outcomes they receive or 
are excluded from and how they reason about the situation. Regarding CRE initiatives, two 
essential aspects define their institutional nature: on the one hand, they are economic 
organisations that operate on a market and generate part of their revenues through trading of 
energy. On the other hand, they share strong community features. From an institutional 
perspective, communities are social institutions characterised by high entry and exit costs and 
non-anonymous interactions among members (Bowles and Gintis, 2002). In addition, 
interactions between community members are more frequent and extensive than interactions 
with ‘outsiders’. These structural characteristics of interactions contrast with those of other 
institutions, such as markets, at least in their idealised forms. Market interactions are characterised 
by ephemerality of contact, anonymity among interacting actors and ease of entry and exit 
(Bowles and Gintis, 2002). In contrast to markets, by facilitating direct personal interactions, 
communities effectively encourage the formation of norms, such as interpersonal trust, social 
identification, solidarity, reciprocity, reputation, personal pride, vengeance, etc. Thus, depending 
on how these market and community institutional logics are prioritised within CRE initiatives, it 
is likely that they will structure social interactions among members differently and will foster the 
creation of norms to a lesser or greater extent.  
Second, spatial factors may also influence members’ motivations. Indeed, by facilitating direct 
social interactions and face-to-face communication, spatial closeness further facilitates the 
activation of social norms in the group. Not all communities are identical in this respect 
(Heisnaken et al. 2010). In particular, a relevant distinction can be made between ‘communities of 
place’ and ‘communities of interest’. A community of place, or place-based community, is a 
community defined by geography: people are bound together because of where they reside, work, 
visit or otherwise spend a continuous portion of their time. A community of interest is not 
defined by space, but by some common bond (e.g. a feeling of attachment) or entity (e.g. a 
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church group) (Gilchreist, 2000). It can be expected that social norms are stronger in 
communities of place as compared to communities of interest, as interactions are generally more 
personal and frequent.  
Third, individual motivations to invest and participate in CRE projects can also be explained 
from the innovation adoption perspective (Bergek et al, 2013). In the innovation adoption 
literature, investment decisions are neither inevitable nor uniform across a population of potential 
adopters. Instead, following Rogers (1995), different consumer segments can be distinguished 
according to their attitude to the diffusion of new innovations: ‘innovators’ are the first group to 
purchase a new product in its ‘introduction’ phase. They have a high risk tolerance and are 
therefore willing to try out new technologies with low performance. This group is followed by 
‘early adopters’ in the ‘early growth’ phase, who agree to try out relatively crude technologies as 
long as they see a clear potential benefit. Finally, the ‘(early) majority’, during the market ‘take-off’ 
phase, gathers people who prefer to ‘wait and see’ in order to learn from earlier adopters or even 
until a standard has been set and the technology is really proven. Although this theory has mainly 
be applied to technological innovations, there may well be different groups of adopters of 
‘institutional’ innovations, just as technological innovations spread within societies at different 
rates. For instance, in his analysis of emergence and development of two car-sharing cooperatives 
in Switzerland, Truffer (2003) shows how the membership evolved from a handful of 
environmentally concerned early users highly involved in the provision of services, to individuals 
mainly driven by financial motives, as pressure for more differentiation and professionalisation 
accompanied organisational growth. In the same perspective, the distinction between project 
frontrunners and average members has been shown to be relevant for sustainability transition 
(Dóci and Vasileiadou, 2015; Kern and Smith, 2008), and previous literature has argued that 
citizens prefer different degrees of participation (Rogers et al., 2012), although this has not been 
systematically explored. 
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In conclusion, while RE investors’ motivations at the community level and their degree of 
engagement may be expected to be heterogeneous, very little is known in the current literature 
about how and why such diversity occurs. The present paper thus specifically deals with the 
following two questions: (1) what explains the heterogeneity, if any, of motivations among members of 
community renewable energy projects? (2) What are the implications of such a potential heterogeneity in terms of 
members’ level of engagement in projects? Based on previous literature, the explanatory factors to be 
considered for potential heterogeneity are threefold: institutional characteristics of CRE and, 
specifically, the relative weights given to market and community logics within initiatives, spatial 
characteristics of membership, and attitudes to innovation diffusion (innovators, early adopters 
etc.).  
3. Methodology 
3.1. Field setting 
This paper reports on two case studies of RE cooperatives, Ecopower and BeauVent, located in 
Flanders (the northern part of Belgium). In 2011, Ecopower and BeauVent represented 87% of 
all members of RE cooperatives in Flanders. This figure ensures that the cases of BeauVent and 
Ecopower represent a large majority of members of such organisations in this region. 
The two cooperatives studied here share a number of common features, which aid in 
comparability of the cases: they deal exclusively with RE (mostly from wind power, but also solar 
and, in the case of Ecopower, biomass and wood pellets), they are owned by individual members 
who each have equal voting rights and receive limited dividends following the principles of the 
cooperative movement, and they are part of the Belgian federation of RE cooperatives 
‘Rescoop.be’.  
However, the cases also differ across several important dimensions. First of all, Ecopower is an 
electricity supplier, while BeauVent is not. When Ecopower started supplying electricity, i.e. when 
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the Belgian electricity market was liberalised in 2003, its membership rose dramatically because 
individuals had to become cooperative members in order to be supplied with green electricity. 
Hence, a second important difference is the size: as a result of its electricity supply activities, 
Ecopower has increased substantially and is much larger than BeauVent. In 2013, the former was 
almost twenty times larger than the latter in terms of number of members and ten times larger in 
terms of total capital (Table 1). BeauVent itself does not supply electricity, but through an 
agreement between the cooperatives, BeauVent members can be supplied with electricity by 
Ecopower even if they are not formally members of the latter. 
 
Table 1. General characteristics of cooperatives. 
 Ecopower BeauVent 
Year of creation 1991 2000 
Number of full-time equivalent workers 22 5.37 
Number of members 47,419 2,391 
Price of one cooperative share (in euro) 250 250 
Total capital (in euro) 48,328,750 4,781,500 
Source: created by author based on 2013 data provided by the cooperatives. 
 
For studying the evolution of the institutional characteristics of organisations, it is meaningful to 
identify the main stages of their organisational development. Ecopower has gone through three 
main phases. The first, from the year of its creation in 1991-1999, can be labelled the ‘idealistic’ 
phase. The original goal of the cooperative was to gather small amounts of money from 
motivated individuals to finance the refurbishment of small hydropower installations. As such, 
during this period, the cooperative itself was not involved in any energy production activities. 
The second, the ‘energy production’ phase, corresponds to the period 2000-2002. It started with 
the installation of three wind turbines in the city of Eeklo, which were financed by a recruitment 
campaign launched in 2000. The third phase is the ‘supply’ phase, which is identified with the 
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start of electricity supply in 2003 and extends to the present. Parallel to its supply activities, 
Ecopower continues to invest in RE projects. BeauVent, on the other hand, has gone through 
two main phases: an idealistic phase from 2000 to 2004 and an energy production phase from 
2005 onwards.  
There are four types of material incentives attached to participation in the co-ownership of the 
cooperatives studied. A first incentive is the possibility to be supplied with electricity at a low 
price. A second incentive is that Ecopower does not charge any fixed fee for electricity 
connection and only charges for what is actually consumed. This means that a member who does 
not consume anything does not pay anything. This is likely to be a strong motivation for people 
who produce their own electricity. A third incentive is the return on investment in the form of 
dividends distributed by each cooperative. These dividends are limited to 6% in both cases 
because these cooperatives are recognised by the Belgian National Council of Cooperation. The 
fourth type of incentive is the transparency of pricing, since Ecopower offers a single tariff, 
which includes all costs (transport and distribution costs, taxes, VAT, costs for public service 
obligations). In addition, there is no differentiation between day and night or according to the 
consumption level. 
3.2. Data collection 
Household data was collected through an online questionnaire-based survey of cooperative 
members conducted between May and June 2014. The cooperatives provided the members’ email 
addresses. 36,642 emails were sent to Ecopower members and 849 emails were sent to BeauVent 
members. In addition, a paper version of the questionnaire was handed out during the General 
Assembly of both organisations, with the objective of reaching a profile of people who otherwise 
would not have been reached by the online questionnaire. Indeed, the participants of the General 
Assemblies are typically an older public who, presumably, may have a lower usage of the Internet. 
195 paper versions of the questionnaire were handed out during the general assembly of 
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Ecopower and 43 during the assembly of BeauVent. Thus, 37,729 versions of the questionnaire 
were distributed in total. 4,061 respondents participated in the survey. This represents a response 
rate of 10.8%, which is comparable to response rates obtained in similar surveys (e.g. Litvine and 
Wüstenhagen, 2011), although it should make us cautious in drawing firm conclusions about the 
generality of members. In order to better isolate the differences between organisations, 
individuals who were members of both cooperatives were excluded from the analysis.  
Information about the location of members and their period of membership (i.e. how many years 
they were part of their cooperative) was available for the whole underlying population of 
cooperative members. In order to improve the representativeness of the collected sample 
regarding these variables, their distribution was computed for the whole population and 
compared to their distribution in the sample. Weights were then assigned to the observations 
with a view to reproducing the distributions of the aforementioned variables in the collected 
sample, using post-stratification adjustments (Table 2). Post-stratification classifies the sample by 
group or stratum based on the characteristics of the population and then weights individuals in 
each group up to the population total in that group, with values above 1.00 boosting the weight 
given to data collected from participants in the relevant group. 
 
Table 2. Weighting factors used in the data analysis. 
 Period of membership (in years) 
 0 ≤ x < 5 5 ≤ x< 10 10 ≤ x< 15 15 ≤ x< 20 20 < x 
Antwerp 1.056 0.845 0.724 0.015 0.120 
Brussels 1.170 0.936 0.802 0.016 0.132 
Limburg 1.240 0.993 0.850 0.017 0.140 
East-Flanders 1.199 0.960 0.822 0.016 0.136 
Flemish Brabant 1.069 0.856 0.733 0.015 0.121 
West-Flanders 1.325 1.061 0.909 0.018 0.150 
Other 1.170 0.936 0.802 0.016 0.132 
Source: created by author based on survey (2014). 
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3.3. Variables 
The questionnaire was designed to collect data on indicators of the variables of interest, namely 
members’ motivations, some of their socio-psychological characteristics and some information 
about their interactions with cooperatives, including their level of engagement. Indicators of 
motivations consist of a series of ordinal variables which have been constructed by asking 
respondents to indicate on a five-point scale (from 1 = ‘not at all’ to 5 = ‘completely’) the extent 
to which a specific motivation had played a role in their decision to join the cooperative. More 
specifically, questions were included to assess the importance of material incentives, which 
correspond to self-regarding motivations, including return on investment, low electricity price, 
the absence of charges for connection and the transparency of pricing.  
Furthermore, in order to assess the importance of norm-driven motivations, members were 
asked to what extent they valued the production of renewable energy and the influence of other 
people’s advice in their decision to join the cooperative. The former is related to the norm of 
environmental concern, while the latter is linked to norms of interpersonal trust and social 
identification to the group, consistent with the theoretical framework. In addition, different 
socio-psychological characteristics were measured: pro-environmental orientation, interpersonal 
trust and social identification to the cooperative. These different characteristics are based on a 
series of items that asked respondents to indicate on a five-point scale (seven points in the case 
of interpersonal trust) the extent to which they agree or disagree with different statements. The 
items were then aggregated into single indices. Individuals’ pro-environmental orientation was 
captured through two dimensions: pro-environmental self-identity and daily behaviours. In order 
to measure the degree of pro-environmental self-identity, six items from existing questionnaires 
were selected and adapted (Castro et al., 2009; Fielding et al., 2008; Whitmarsh and O'Neill, 
2010). These items measure to what extent the respondent perceives herself as a person 
concerned with environmental issues. To measure respondents’ pro-environmental engagement 
in terms of daily behaviours, pro-environmental behaviours were selected from existing studies 
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(Delacolette et al., 2011), such as ‘travel short distances on foot or by bike’, ‘avoid plastic bags in 
shops’ or ‘turn off the tap while brushing my teeth’. Respondents were asked to indicate the 
frequency at which they had adopted each behaviour during the last 15 days. Interpersonal trust 
was measured using three items selected from the World Value Survey. Finally, social 
identification was measured by five items adapted from existing studies (Tyler and Blader, 2001; 
Stürmer and Kampmeier, 2003). Table A1 (Appendix) reports the specific statements for all 
socio-psychological characteristics, along with statistics to test for internal consistency (item-total 
correlations and Cronbach’s alpha). The results indicate good internal consistency and support 
combining the items into summated scales.  
In addition, some data were collected about the history of members’ interactions with their 
organisations. First, members were asked the year when they joined their cooperative, so that 
their period of membership (in years) could be computed. Second, in order to assess members’ 
level of interactions with other cooperative members, they were asked whether or not they had 
other members within their direct social network (relatives, friends, neighbours). Third, as 
indicators of members’ level of engagement, data about the frequency of attendance to general 
assemblies and about the number of cooperative shares purchased was collected. Respondents 
had to indicate on a four-point scale the frequency at which they attended general assemblies 
(1=‘never’, 2=‘sometimes’, 3=‘often’, 4=‘always’). As to the number of shares purchased, two 
sources of information were available. On the one hand, respondents were asked to indicate on a 
six-point scale how many shares they had purchased (1 = ‘1 to 9 ’, 2 = ‘10 to 19’, 3 = ‘20 to 29’, 
4= ‘30 to 39’, 5 = ‘40 to 49’, 6 = ‘more than 50’). On the other hand, the cooperatives provided 
data about the exact number of shares purchased for the entire population of members. Finally, 
members’ postal codes were used to analyse the spatial characteristics of the different categories 
of members, based on information provided by the cooperatives for the entire population. 
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3.4. Data analysis 
The goals of this paper are to analyse the potential heterogeneity of members’ motivations to join 
RE cooperatives in relation to institutional factors, spatial factors and attitudes to innovation 
diffusion, as well as the potential implications of such heterogeneity in terms of level of 
engagement. To do so, the sample of Ecopower members was divided into three categories of 
cooperative members, which correspond to the three phases described in section 3.1 which 
Ecopower went through: members who joined the cooperative during the idealistic phase (1991-
1999), members who joined during the energy production phase (2000-2002) and members who 
joined during the supply phase (2003-today). As explained later, this division is meaningful 
because these three phases also correspond to different institutional settings. The variables of 
interest could then be compared across these three groups and with BeauVent members.3 In the 
rest of the article, the different groups are referred to in the following way: the three successive 
cohorts of Ecopower members are respectively called ‘Ecopower 1’, ‘Ecopower 2’ and 
‘Ecopower 3’, and BeauVent members are called ‘BeauVent’. Table 3 presents the number of 
members in each category, based on data for the entire population. As shown in the table, 
Ecopower 3 is much larger than the three other categories. 
 
Table 3. Number of members by category. 
Category Number of members (%) 
Ecopower 1 47 (0.09%) 
Ecopower 2 656 (1.32%) 
Ecopower 3 46,716 (93.79%) 
BeauVent members 2,391 (4.80%) 
Total 49,810 (100%) 
Source: created by author based on 2013 data provided by the cooperatives. 
 
Correlation analysis and statistical tests were performed to analyse members’ motivations and 
characteristics, and compare the different categories. Since most of the variables used in the 
                                                          
3
 BeauVent members could not be distinguished according to different periods as was done for Ecopower 
members, due to a too small sample. 
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analysis were ordinal, statistical tools which only use the ordinal information in the data were 
needed. To conduct our correlation analysis, the Spearman’s correlation coefficient was used. It 
ranges from -1 (perfect negative correlation) to +1 (perfect positive correlation). In addition, 
Kruskal-Wallis H tests were performed to determine whether there were statistically significant 
differences across the different groups of members. The Kruskal-Wallis H test is a rank-based 
nonparametric method that can be used to determine whether three or more independent 
samples, which may be of unequal sizes, originate from the same distribution. The scores 
reported on the rating scales by the different groups of members were transformed into ranks to 
conduct the Kruskal-Wallis tests. The mean ranks were computed for each group and for each 
variable by dividing its rank sum by its sample size. If the four sampled populations were actually 
identical, the mean ranks would be expected to be about equal. The Kruskal-Wallis test enables to 
determine whether at least one group of members differs significantly from at least one other 
group. Kruskal-Wallis tests were combined with Dunn’s multiple comparison tests. The Dunn’s 
test is a post-hoc test which can be performed to analyse the specific sample pairs that are 
dissimilar from each other.  
Two variables used in the analysis were not ordinal and required other methods than a Kruskall-
Wallis test: the presence of other members in the direct social network, which was binary, and the 
number of shares purchased based on the data provided by cooperatives, which was continuous. 
For the first, binary, variable, tests of pairwise comparison of proportions were performed for 
each pair of groups using Bonferroni corrections to correct for multiple comparisons (Section 
4.4.). For the second, continuous, variable, a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) with 
Bonferroni correction and subsequent pairwise comparisons were conducted (Section 4.5.). 
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4. Results  
4.1. Correlation analysis 
Table 4 presents the results of the correlation analysis. Unsurprisingly, there is a high positive 
association between pro-environmental orientation and the production of renewable energy. 
These two variables are also relatively strongly positively correlated with social identification. This 
indicates that members who identify strongly with the organisation also have high environmental 
concerns. Interpersonal trust is also positively correlated with pro-environmental orientation and 
social identification, although to a lesser extent. 
By contrast, material incentives are weakly correlated with social identification and pro-
environmental orientation, but are relatively highly positively associated with each other. This 
suggests that self-regarding motivations and norm-driven motivations are mutually exclusive to a 
certain extent: people who joined the cooperative for self-regarding reasons do not identify with 
it very strongly and have a relatively low pro-environmental orientation. Interestingly, the people 
for whom others’ advice and, therefore, social norms, played a relatively important role in their 
decisions to join the organisations also have a relatively strong social identification. Participation 
in general assemblies is positively associated with social identification, the period of membership 
and the number of shares purchased. The number of shares purchased is also strongly positively 
correlated with the return on investment, but poorly associated with social identification, pro-
environmental orientation and interpersonal trust. 
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Table 4. Correlation matrix. 
Spearman’s rho 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. Production of renewable 
energy 
            
2. Return on investment -0.03*            
3. Electricity price -0.14*** 0.22***           
4. Absence of connection 
charges 
-0.18*** 0.24*** 0.28***          
5. Transparency of pricing -0.09*** 0.17*** 0.40*** 0.62***         
6. Others' advice 0.08*** 0.17*** 0.10*** 0.14*** 0.12***        
7. Social identification 0.35*** 0.07*** -0.02 -0.01 0.06*** 0.26***       
8. Pro-environmental 
orientation  
0.40*** -0.07*** -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.05*** 0.08*** 0.44***      
9. Interpersonal trust 0.13*** -0.11*** -0.09*** -0.13*** -0.06*** -0.01 0.12*** 0.17***     
10. Participation in general 
assemblies 
0.06*** 0.07*** -0.05*** 0.03 0.03* 0.04** 0.18*** 0.05*** 0.00    
11. Number of shares 
purchased 
0.00 0.28*** -0.06*** 0.01 -0.01 -0.04** 0.06*** 0.02 -0.02 0.18***   
12. Presence of other members 
in social network 
0.04** 0.05*** -0.03 0.02 0.02 0.17*** 0.13*** 0.10*** 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.07***  
13. Membership period 0.13*** 0.04* -0.04** -0.12*** -0.06*** -0.05*** 0.16*** 0.13*** 0.07*** 0.15*** 0.16*** 0.07*** 
Source: created by author based on survey (2014). 
* Significant at the 10% level. 
** Significant at the 5% level. 
*** Significant at the 1% level. 
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4.2. Motivations to join cooperatives 
Let us now turn to the comparison of motivations to join cooperatives across categories of 
members.4 The Kruskal-Wallis H tests showed that, for each motivation except the influence of 
others’ advice, at least one category differed significantly from at least one of the other categories. 
Table 5 provides the results of the Dunn’s tests, along with the mean ranks for each group of 
members. The pairs of groups that are significantly different from each other are in the far right 
column. 
 
Table 5. Comparison of motivations to join the cooperative. 
Variable Ecopower 1 Ecopower 2 Ecopower 3 BeauVent Statistically significant 
comparisons  
Production 
of renewable 
energy  
2219.62 (43) 1803.12 (94) 
 
1655.52 
(3141) 
 
1827.06 (59) 
 
Ecopower 1 vs. Ecopower 2 *** 
Ecopower 1 vs. Ecopower 3 *** 
Ecopower 2 vs. Ecopower 3 * 
Ecopower 1 vs. BeauVent ** 
Return on 
investments 
1689.13 (43) 1575.21 (94) 1665.07 
(3141) 
2067.19 (59) Ecopower 1 vs. BeauVent*** 
Ecopower 2 vs. BeauVent*** 
Ecopower 3 vs. BeauVent** 
Electricity 
price 
1146.58 (40) 1364.01 (90) 1572.20 
(2964) 
1832.80 
(22a) 
Ecopower 1 vs. Ecopower 2* 
Ecopower 1 vs. Ecopower 3*** 
Ecopower 2 vs. Ecopower 3** 
Ecopower 3 vs. BeauVenta * 
Absence of 
connection 
charges  
1294.94 (39) 
 
1219.51 (90) 1571.14 
(2966) 
1747.41 
(22a) 
Ecopower 1 vs. Ecopower 3** 
Ecopower 2 vs. Ecopower 3*** 
Ecopower 1 vs. BeauVenta ** 
Ecopower 2 vs. BeauVenta *** 
Transparenc
y of pricing 
1344.71 (39) 1252.51 (91) 1668.26 
(2972) 
1747.41 
(22a) 
Ecopower 1 vs. Ecopower 3** 
Ecopower 2 vs. Ecopower 3*** 
Ecopower 1 vs. BeauVenta ** 
Ecopower 2 vs. BeauVenta *** 
Influence of 
others’ 
advice 
1724.37 (43) 1572.89 (94) 1651 (3141) 1790.73 (59) None 
Source: created by author based on survey (2014). 
Note: numbers are mean ranks and, in parentheses, sample sizes. 
a: only BeauVent members who were supplied by Ecopower were considered. 
* Significant at the 10% level. 
** Significant at the 5% level. 
*** Significant at the 1% level. 
 
  
                                                          
4
 Figure B1 (Appendix) presents the relative frequencies by categories of cooperative members for each 
motivation. 
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Regarding the production of renewable energy, Ecopower 1 is the group for which the 
production of renewable energy significantly matters the most, compared to Ecopower 2, 
Ecopower 3, and BeauVent. Similarly, this factor is significantly more important for Ecopower 2 
when compared to Ecopower 3. By contrast, there is no significant difference between BeauVent 
and Ecopower 2, or between BeauVent and Ecopower 3.  
The Dunn’s test for the return on investments clearly indicates that BeauVent significantly values 
the return on investments more compared to Ecopower members, regardless of the category. On 
the other hand, there is no significant difference between the three groups of Ecopower 
members.  
Regarding the electricity price, the absence of charges for connection and the transparency of 
pricing, an examination of the results reveal that these three factors all play a more important role 
for members in Ecopower 3 than for those in Ecopower 1 and 2. This may be explained by the 
fact that Ecopower 3 is constituted by members who joined the cooperative after it started its 
supply activities and are thus more likely to be attracted by incentives related with electricity 
supply5. 
4.3. Socio-psychological characteristics 
Let us now turn to the analysis of socio-psychological characteristics, i.e. social identification, 
pro-environmental orientation and interpersonal trust (Table 6). Ecopower 1, Ecopower 2 and 
BeauVent seem to be very similar groups in terms of social identification and pro-environmental 
orientation. There is no statistically significant difference across these three groups, except that 
members in Ecopower 1 identify significantly more to the cooperative than BeauVent members, 
on average. On the other hand, Ecopower 3 appears to stand out clearly. Members belonging to 
this group identify significantly less to the cooperative and are less pro-environmentally oriented, 
on average, than the other three groups.  
                                                          
5
 BeauVent also significantly differs in several ways from other categories of members, but these differences are 
not very informative because the sample of BeauVent members has been restricted to members who are supplied 
by Ecopower only. 
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Table 6. Comparison of socio-psychological characteristics. 
Variable Ecopower 1 Ecopower 2 Ecopower 3 BeauVent Statistically significant 
comparisons 
Social 
identification 
2222.28 (43) 1883.06 (93) 1497.45 
(3132) 
1603.26 (59) Ecopower 1 vs. Ecopower 3*** 
Ecopower 2 vs. Ecopower 3*** 
Ecopower 1 vs. BeauVent* 
Ecopower 3 vs. BeauVent** 
Pro-environmental 
orientation 
2059.72 (43) 1930.43 (92) 1636.13 
(3111) 
1879.22 (59) Ecopower 1 vs. Ecopower 3*** 
Ecopower 2 vs. Ecopower 3*** 
Ecopower 3 vs. BeauVent* 
Interpersonal trust 1730.81 (43) 1901.87 (92) 1642.51 
(3105) 
1612.25 (59) Ecopower 2 vs. Ecopower 3*** 
Ecopower 2 vs. BeauVent** 
Source: created by author based on survey (2014). 
Note: numbers are mean ranks and, in parentheses, sample sizes. 
* Significant at the 10% level. 
** Significant at the 5% level. 
*** Significant at the 1% level. 
 
Regarding interpersonal trust, differences are less clear-cut. The only significant differences 
observed are between Ecopower 2 and Ecopower 3 and between Ecopower 2 and BeauVent. In 
both cases, members in Ecopower 2 have a higher level of interpersonal trust, on average, than 
members of the other group.  
4.4. Spatial and relational antecedents 
In Section 2.2., it was argued that the spatial characteristics of the membership may partly explain 
the heterogeneity among members’ motivations. In particular, it has been suggested that spatial 
proximity of members is likely to encourage social interactions, which, in turn, facilitate 
exchanges of information and enhance trust and other social norms among members. It is thus 
interesting to examine the spatial localisation of the different categories of members.  
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Figure 1. Spatial location of Ecopower and BeauVent members by provinces. 
 
Source: created by author based on 2013 data provided by the cooperatives covering the entire population of 
members. 
 
Figure 1 shows the spatial distribution of members by province and by categories. As shown in 
the figure, over 43% of members in Ecopower 1 are spatially concentrated in the province of 
Flemish Brabant. This results from the fact that the very first project of the cooperative was to 
gather small amounts of money to finance the refurbishment of small hydropower installations 
located close to Leuven, in Flemish Brabant. On the other hand, 43% of members in Ecopower 
2 are spatially concentrated in the province of East Flanders. This shift of the ‘centre of gravity’ 
of membership corresponds to the installation of the first wind turbines in Eeklo, a small 
municipality located in East Flanders, and the parallel recruitment campaign that took place to 
attract new members. By contrast, Ecopower 3 is not concentrated in any specific province, but 
is rather distributed relatively equally across all provinces of Flanders. This reflects the fact that 
when Ecopower became electricity supplier, it extended its activities across all of Flanders. The 
evolution of the spatial distribution of membership is thus closely related to the location of the 
different projects developed by the cooperative. Finally, it is interesting to note that Ecopower 
members are nearly absent from Brussels or territories outside Flanders. This is not surprising, as 
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Ecopower supplies electricity in Flanders exclusively. Regarding BeauVent, Figure 1 shows that 
more than 57% of BeauVent membership is concentrated in the province of West-Flanders, 
where the cooperative was founded and where it develops most of its projects. 
 
Table 7. Comparison of social interactions between members. 
Variable Ecopower 1 Ecopower 2 Ecopower 3 BeauVent Statistically significant 
comparisons 
Presence of 
members in 
social networks 
(friends, relatives, 
neighbours) (in 
%) 
77.13 (43) 67.20 (92) 57.52 (3103) 69.11 (56) Ecopower 1 vs. Ecopower 3* 
Ecopower 2 vs. Ecopower 3** 
Ecopower 3 vs. BeauVent** 
Source: created by author based on survey (2014). 
Note: numbers are proportions and, in parentheses, sample sizes. 
* Significant at the 10% level. 
** Significant at the 5% level. 
 
How are these differences in spatial location reflected in terms of social interactions with other 
cooperative members? Table 7 presents the proportion, in each group, of members with other 
members in their direct social network (relatives, friends, neighbours). The difference between 
Ecopower 3 and other groups of cooperative members is striking: Ecopower 1, Ecopower 2 and 
BeauVent contain a significantly higher proportion of individuals with other cooperative 
members in their social network as compared to Ecopower 3. In contrast, there is no significant 
difference between Ecopower 1, Ecopower 2 and BeauVent. These findings confirm that the 
more concentrated spatial locations of Ecopower 1, Ecopower 2 and BeauVent are associated 
with a higher frequency of social interactions as compared to Ecopower 3. 
4.5. Implications in terms of level of engagement 
Finally, the different categories of cooperative members are compared in terms of their level of 
engagement, measured by the number of cooperative shares purchased and by the frequency of 
attendance of general assemblies. Regarding the number of shares purchased, data on the 
distribution of the number of shares covering the entire population of members was used. 
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Interestingly, Figure 2 clearly shows that members belonging to Ecopower 2 invest, on average, 
considerably larger amounts than members in any other category.  
 
Figure 2. Average number of shares purchased by categories of members. 
 
Source: created by author based on 2013 data provided by the cooperatives covering the entire population of 
members. 
 
The results of the Bonferroni multiple-comparison test in Table 8 confirm that these differences 
are statistically significant. They also show that BeauVent members make significantly larger 
investments than members in Ecopower 3. By contrast, there is no significant difference between 
Ecopower 1 and Ecopower 3 and between Ecopower 1 and BeauVent. To interpret these 
findings, it is worth recalling that members belonging to Ecopower 2 joined when the 
cooperative installed its first wind turbines. The results thus suggest that the concrete realisation 
of the first wind energy project and the expectation of tangible economic benefits coming with it 
attracted many members willing to invest larger amounts of money in the cooperative.  
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Table 8. Comparison of members’ level of engagement. 
Variable Ecopower 1 Ecopower 2 Ecopower 3 BeauVent 
Statistically significant 
comparisons 
Number of 
shares 
purchased 
5.30  
(47) a 
12.06  
(656) a 
3.98  
(46,716) a 
5.55  
 (2,391) a 
Ecopower 1 vs. Ecopower 2*** 
Ecopower 2 vs. Ecopower 3*** 
Ecopower 2 vs. BeauVent*** 
Ecopower 3 vs. BeauVent*** 
Participation 
in general 
assemblies 
2066.91  
(43) b 
1721.95  
(94) b 
1639.97 
 (3122) b 
2277.26  
 (57) b 
Ecopower 1 vs. Ecopower 2*** 
Ecopower 1 vs. Ecopower 3*** 
Ecopower 2 vs. Ecopower 3** 
Ecopower 1 vs. BeauVent*** 
Ecopower 2 vs. BeauVent*** 
Ecopower 3 vs. BeauVent*** 
Source: as to the number of shares purchased, data provided by cooperatives and covering the entire population of 
members was used. The data for the participation in general assemblies is based on the author’s survey (2014). 
Note: a Bonferroni multiple-comparison test and a Dunn’s test have been performed to compare the average 
number of shares purchased and the participation in general assemblies respectively.  
a: Numbers are the mean scores of the number of shares purchased and, in parentheses, sample sizes. 
b: Numbers are mean ranks and, in parentheses, sample sizes. 
** Significant at the 5% level. 
*** Significant at the 1% level. 
 
Regarding the participation in general assemblies, Table 8 shows that members belonging to 
Ecopower 1 attend assemblies more frequently, on average, than the other two categories of 
Ecopower members. Similarly, members in Ecopower 2 have significantly more frequent 
participation than members belonging to Ecopower 3. Finally, BeauVent members attend general 
assemblies significantly more frequently than any cohort of Ecopower members. 
5. Discussion 
An important finding is that cooperative members cannot be regarded as one homogeneous 
group in terms of motivations. Their apparent uniformity hides significant differences in 
preferences and interests across categories of members. The two first cohorts of Ecopower 
members as well as BeauVent members are more pro-environmentally oriented and identify more 
strongly to their cooperative than the third generation of Ecopower members. Moreover, the two 
first generations of Ecopower members attach more value to RE production than the third 
generation. Material incentives attached to electricity supply are also less important to the former 
than to the latter. In addition, the second generation of Ecopower members also has a higher 
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degree of interpersonal trust when compared to Ecopower 3. Overall, the results show that ‘early’ 
Ecopower members, i.e. members of the first and second cohorts, and BeauVent members tend 
to be norm-driven individuals who are ready to join the cooperative even in the absence of clear 
material benefits, based on solid environmental convictions or strong feelings of belonging in the 
group (although the results also indicate some significant differences across these three 
categories).6 In contrast, ‘late-coming’ Ecopower members, i.e. those who joined the cooperative 
during its ‘supply’ phase, are less motivated by environmental values or social identification and 
more driven by material incentives attached to electricity supply.  
These differences can be explained by different factors. First, they should be related with 
institutional dimensions. Indeed, the results show how shaping incentives affect the structure of 
social interactions and the population of types of individuals who are most likely to come to 
prominence in a particular setting. By attaching tangible material benefits in the form of 
electricity supply to cooperative membership, Ecopower modified the incentive structure faced 
by existing and potential members. It introduced relatively more ‘market’ logic and undermined 
the ‘community’ logic in its organisational model. This modified the composition of the 
membership, which evolved toward less norm-driven and more self-regarding members, and 
diluted its social capital. In contrast, BeauVent, which did not establish direct market transactions 
with its members, contains more norm-driven members. Overall, early Ecopower members and 
BeauVent members also tend to have a higher level of engagement in the cooperative. On the 
one hand, they participate more frequently in general assemblies than late-coming Ecopower 
members. On the other hand, BeauVent members and the second generation of Ecopower 
members purchase more cooperative shares. 
Second, this heterogeneity can be explained by members’ spatial localisation. Indeed, the two first 
generations of Ecopower members and BeauVent members are more spatially concentrated as 
compared to the third generation of Ecopower members. Relying on the distinction between 
                                                          
6
 It is worth noting, for instance, the important exception of BeauVent members, for whom the return on 
investments is seen as more important than for any generation of Ecopower members. 
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community of place and community of interest introduced in Section 2.2., it can be said that the 
first and second cohorts of Ecopower members and BeauVent members form communities of 
place, while the third generation of members forms a community of interest. This spatial 
distribution explains why a higher proportion of early Ecopower members and BeauVent 
members have fellow members in their direct social network. Spatial patterns thus reinforce the 
influence of the changes in institutional settings just presented. Indeed, as explained in Section 
2.2., by facilitating direct social interactions and face-to-face communication, spatial closeness 
between members enhances the level of social norms in a group. In contrast, the broadening of 
the geographical scope of economic operations resulting from the start of electricity supply 
weakened the bonds among cooperative members, as well as between them and their 
organisation. 
Third, these findings should also be related with the innovation adoption perspective. Indeed, the 
case of Ecopower indicates that cooperative organisations and their membership are dynamic 
entities that evolve over time.7 In this respect, a parallelism can be made between the different 
cohorts of Ecopower members and the segments of adopters of innovations defined by Rogers 
(1995), the cooperative management of RE projects being the institutional innovation in this 
case. The first members can be considered as ‘institutional innovators’. They were highly 
motivated individuals who agreed to provide time and lend ‘patient’ capital, i.e. capital with no 
expectation of turning a quick profit. This would not have been possible with a for-profit 
developer and traditional venture capital. It can thus be argued that the idealistic phase took place 
in a ‘niche’ environment, i.e. a space relatively isolated from selective pressures of the market 
where the technologies could develop and their social embedding could take place (Kemp et al., 
1998). In addition, at that time few traditional developers in Belgium were interested in RE. The 
cooperative therefore took advantage of its embeddedness in this social network of highly 
motivated people to develop technologies (wind turbines, solar panels) for which there were still 
                                                          
7
 It is more difficult to draw similar conclusions in the case of BeauVent, as its membership was not compared 
over different periods of time. 
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no economies of scale. The second important step for Ecopower was the realisation of its first 
wind energy projects in 2000. It then attracted a second wave of members, who were still more 
norm-driven than the third generation, but were also motivated by the actual installation of the 
first production assets which secured tangible economic benefits. From the innovation diffusion 
perspective, these members correspond to the early adopters. A third important turning point 
was the liberalisation of the energy market in 2003. Then, Ecopower and BeauVent took 
divergent development paths. Ecopower chose to start supplying electricity, while BeauVent did 
not. By doing so, Ecopower ‘mainstreamed’ the innovation represented by cooperative 
management of RE projects, as it introduced more market logic in its organisational model. It can 
also be shown that electricity supply was accompanied by further standardisation of management 
practices (Bauwens and Huybrechts, 2015). Ecopower then started attracting members who were 
quite distinct from early members and who developed more of a customers’ attitude in wanting 
to benefit from the advantages of electricity supply without being strongly involved. In Rogers 
(1995)’s terms, they correspond to the early majority of adopters. On the other hand, this was an 
essential step for increasing market share and organisational development because it enabled 
additional members to be attracted and to mobilise more resources. This highlights the trade-off 
that is likely to arise for CRE initiatives between the creation and maintenance of a high level of 
social capital and the scaling up of activities (Smith et al., 2015). 
6. Conclusion and policy implications 
The paper has empirically investigated the heterogeneity among members of CRE projects in 
terms of motivations and level of engagement. Regarding the first research question, the analysis 
shows that members’ motives are indeed heterogeneous. This diversity can be explained, first of 
all, by institutional factors and, more precisely, by the respective weights of market and 
community logics within CRE initiatives. When the community logic prevails members are more 
norm-driven, whereas when a market relationship is established between the organisation and its 
31 
 
members these are more motivated by material incentives. Second, this heterogeneity of 
motivations is linked to spatial patterns, as evidence suggests that communities of place are more 
likely to foster norm-driven behaviours than communities of interest. Third, this heterogeneity 
corresponds to different attitudes to the diffusion of institutional innovations. Indeed, the 
segments of members can clearly be differentiated according to their stance toward cooperative 
management of RE projects. As to the second research question, the paper shows that these 
differences are reflected in the level of engagement of members: norm-driven individuals tend in 
general to invest more and to be more involved in the governance of organisations. 
These findings contribute to the emerging literature on community-based energy projects and on 
the diffusion of grassroots innovations in the field of energy through highlighting the 
heterogeneity of participants’ motivations and relating them to their level of engagement. To 
scholarship interested in energy policy and environmental management, the paper brings a more 
fine-grained analysis of how institutional factors and, in particular, social norms may interplay 
with spatial patterns and attitudes to innovation diffusion in order to shape RE investments at 
the community level. 
Regarding policy and managerial implications, the heterogeneity of investors should be taken into 
account across several dimensions. At the organisational level, in addition to the obvious 
specificities of community-based energy projects as compared to more traditional companies, the 
findings emphasise substantial differences among these initiatives, which in turn require adapted 
policy responsiveness. The results also highlight that even the same community-based 
organisation may contain appreciably different profiles of individual investors in terms of 
motivations and level of engagement. As shown in the analysis, these contrasts tend to 
correspond to different phases of the development of organisations. This confirms the need for 
designing a portfolio of several different policies (a ‘policy mix’) which adapts to the 
development stages of organisations in order to stimulate investments in RE production (Mignon 
and Bergek, 2016). Taking this heterogeneity into account increases the complexity of policy-
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making decisions, but may also considerably enhance their effectiveness. The other side of this 
complexity is that policy-makers and CRE managers can rely on new ways to stimulate RE 
investments. Indeed, in addition to traditional economic incentives, the results suggest that 
relying on norms may be an effective way to influence investment decisions, especially when 
technological or institutional innovations are still in an experimental phase. However, market 
incentives and the activation of social/moral norms should be combined with care, as they are 
likely to interact with each other. Indeed, the introduction of material incentives, such as financial 
rewards or sanctions, may sometimes ‘crowd out’ behaviours that are based on social preferences. 
For instance, Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997) found that proposing financial compensation 
reduced Swiss citizens’ willingness to host a nuclear waste facility. 
As a basis to further explore how members’ motivations are affected by a modification of 
institutional settings, two hypotheses can be formulated. First, it may be the case that motivations 
evolve toward a homogenisation of preferences. That is, members with strong normative drivers 
become less norm-driven over time, due to the introduction of market incentives, the arrival of 
more self-regarding individuals and the resulting increase in size of the organisation. In other 
words, according to the first hypothesis, norm-driven behaviours are crowded out by the 
introduction of material incentives. According to a second hypothesis, there is no such tendency 
toward homogenisation and different profiles of members remain over time. Longitudinal data 
about members’ motivations and preferences would be necessary to test these hypotheses. In 
addition, further research could include the analysis of cooperative organisations in other 
geographical contexts and of other types of community-based energy projects. Finally, additional 
qualitative analysis such as in-depth interviews with cooperative members would also provide a 
more fine-grained analysis of member’s motives and level of engagement. 
33 
 
References 
 
Bamberg, S., Rees, J., Seebauer, S., 2015. Collective climate action: Determinants of participation intention in 
community-based pro-environmental initiatives. Journal of Environmental Psychology 43 155-165. 
Bauwens, T., 2015. Propriété coopérative et acceptabilité sociale de l’éolien terrestre. Reflets et Perspectives de la Vie 
Economique LIV (1), 59-70. 
Bauwens, T., Gotchev, B., Holstenkamp, L., 2016. What drives the development of community energy in Europe? 
The case of wind power cooperatives. Energy Research & Social Science 13 136-147. 
Bauwens, T., Huybrechts, B., 2015. The Frog and the Ox, or How Hybrid Organizations Deal with Growth: The 
Case of Renewable Energy Cooperatives, EMES Conferences Selected Papers Series ECSP-5EMES-06. EMES. 
Bergek, A., Mignon, I., Sundberg, G., 2013. Who invests in renewable electricity production? Empirical evidence and 
suggestions for further research. Energy Policy 56 (0), 568-581. 
Bergman, N., Eyre, N., 2011. What role for microgeneration in a shift to a low carbon domestic energy sector in the 
UK? Energy Efficiency 4 (3), 335-353. 
Bollinger, B., Gillingham, K., 2012. Peer Effects in the Diffusion of Solar Photovoltaic Panels. Marketing Science 31 
(6), 900-912. 
Boon, F.P., Dieperink, C., 2014. Local civil society based renewable energy organisations in the Netherlands: 
Exploring the factors that stimulate their emergence and development. Energy Policy  69 297-307. 
Bowles, S., Gintis, H., 2002. Social Capital And Community Governance. The Economic Journal 112 (483), F419-
F436. 
Bowles, S., Gintis, H., 2009. Beyond Enlightened Self-Interest: Social Norms, Other-Regarding Preferences, and 
Cooperative Behavior, in: Levin, S.A. (Ed.), Games, Groups, and the Global Good. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 
pp. 57-78. 
Brown-Kruse, J., Hummels, D., 1993. Gender effects in laboratory public goods contribution. Journal of Economic 
Behavior & Organization 22 (3), 255-267. 
Castro, P., Garrido, M., Reis, E., Menezes, J., 2009. Ambivalence and conservation behaviour: An exploratory study 
on the recycling of metal cans. Journal of Environmental Psychology 29 (1), 24-33. 
Dawes, R.M., Van De Kragt, A.J.C., Orbell, J.M., 1988. Not me or thee but we: The importance of group identity in 
eliciting cooperation in dilemma situations: Experimental manipulations. Acta Psychologica 68 (1–3), 83-97. 
Delacolette, N., Claus, B., Verbeek, B., Sohet, X., Warlop, L., Dardenne, B., 2011. Fostering Sustainable Behaviors: 
Community-Based Social Marketing. Belgian Science Policy, Brussels. 
Dóci, G., Vasileiadou, E., 2015. “Let׳s do it ourselves” Individual motivations for investing in renewables at 
community level. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 49 41-50. 
Dubreuil, B., Grégoire, J.-F., 2013. Are moral norms distinct from social norms? A critical assessment of Jon Elster 
and Cristina Bicchieri. Theory Decis 75 (1), 137-152. 
Ecopower, 2013. Power Post-Nieuwsbrief van Ecopower cvba. Ecopower cvba, Berchem. 
Eyre, N., 2013. Decentralization of governance in the low-carbon transition, in: Fouquet, R. (Ed.), Handbook on 
Energy and Climate Change. Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, UK, pp. 581–597. 
Fielding, K.S., McDonald, R., Louis, W.R., 2008. Theory of planned behaviour, identity and intentions to engage in 
environmental activism. Journal of Environmental Psychology 28 (4), 318-326. 
Fraj, E., Martinez, E., 2006. Environmental values and lifestyles as determining factors of ecological consumer 
behaviour: an empirical analysis. Journal of Consumer Marketing 23 (3), 133-144. 
Frey, B.S., Oberholzer-Gee, F., 1997. The Cost of Price Incentives: An Empirical Analysis of Motivation Crowding- 
Out. The American Economic Review 87 (4), 746-755. 
Gilchreist, A., 2000. Design for living: the challenge of sustainable communities, in: Barton, H. (Ed.), Sustainable 
Communities: the Potential for Eco-Neighbourhoods. Earthscan, London, pp. 147-159. 
Goette, L., Huffman, D., Meier, S., 2006. The Impact of Group Membership on Cooperation and Norm 
Enforcement: Evidence Using Random Assignment to Real Social Groups. The American Economic Review 96 
(2), 212-216. 
Heiskanen, E., Johnson, M., Robinson, S., Vadovics, E., Saastamoinen, M., 2010. Low-carbon communities as a 
context for individual behavioural change. Energy Policy  38 (12), 7586-7595. 
I.C.A., 1995. Statement on the cooperative identity. Review of International Cooperation 88 (3), 3-4. 
IPCC, 2011. Special Report on Renewable Energy Sources and Climate Change Mitigation. Cambridge University 
Press, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA. 
Kalkbrenner, B.J., Roosen, J., 2016. Citizens’ willingness to participate in local renewable energy projects: The role of 
community and trust in Germany. Energy Research & Social Science 13 60-70. 
Kemp, R., Schot, J., Hoogma, R., 1998. Regime shifts to sustainability through processes of niche formation: The 
approach of strategic niche management. Technology Analysis & Strategic Management 10 (2), 175-198. 
34 
 
Kern, F., Smith, A., 2008. Restructuring energy systems for sustainability? Energy transition policy in the 
Netherlands. Energy Policy 36 (11), 4093-4103. 
Litvine, D., Wüstenhagen, R., 2011. Helping "light green" consumers walk the talk: Results of a behavioural 
intervention survey in the Swiss electricity market. Ecological Economics 70 (3), 462-474. 
Maruyama, Y., Nishikido, M., Iida, T., 2007. The rise of community wind power in Japan: Enhanced acceptance 
through social innovation. Energy Policy 35 (5), 2761-2769. 
McEachern, M., Hanson, S., 2008. Socio-geographic perception in the diffusion of innovation: Solar energy 
technology in Sri Lanka. Energy Policy 36 (7), 2578-2590. 
Mignon, I., Bergek, A., 2016. Investments in renewable electricity production: The importance of policy revisited. 
Renewable Energy 88 307-316. 
Mumford, J., Gray, D., 2010. Consumer engagement in alternative energy—Can the regulators and suppliers be 
trusted? Energy Policy 38 (6), 2664-2671. 
Noll, D., Dawes, C., Rai, V., 2014. Solar Community Organizations and active peer effects in the adoption of 
residential PV. Energy Policy 67 330-343. 
Ostrom, E., 2003. Toward a Behavioral Theory Linking Trust, Reciprocity, and Reputation, in: Ostrom, E., Walker, 
J. (Eds.), Trust & Reciprocity. Interdisciplinary Lessons from Experimental Research. Russell Sage Foundation, 
New York. 
Ostrom, E., 2005. Understanding Institutional Diversity. Princeton University Press, Princeton. 
Rogers, E.M., 1995. Diffusion of Innovations. Free Press, New York. 
Rogers, J.C., Simmons, E.A., Convery, I., Weatherall, A., 2012. Social impacts of community renewable energy 
projects: findings from a woodfuel case study. Energy Policy 42 239-247. 
Sauter, R., Watson, J., 2007. Strategies for the deployment of micro-generation: Implications for social acceptance. 
Energy Policy 35 (5), 2770-2779. 
Schneider, M., Frogatt, A., Thomas, S., 2011. Nuclear Power in a Post-Fukushima World, The world nuclear industry 
status report 2010–2011. Worldwatch Institute. 
Seyfang, G., Park, J.J., Smith, A., 2013. A thousand flowers blooming? An examination of community energy in the 
UK. Energy Policy 61 (0), 977-989. 
Smil, V., 2010. Energy Transitions: History, Requirements, Prospects. ABC-CLIO, Santa Barbara. 
Smith, A., Hargreaves, T., Hielscher, S., Martiskainen, M., Seyfang, G., 2015. Making the most of community 
energies: Three perspectives on grassroots innovation. Environment and Planning A. 
Stürmer, S., Kampmeier, C., 2003. Active citizenship: The role of community identification in community 
volunteerism and local participation. Psychologica Belgica 43 (1-2), 103-122. 
Toke, D., Breukers, S., Wolsink, M., 2008. Wind power deployment outcomes: How can we account for the 
differences? Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 12 (4), 1129-1147. 
trend:research Gmb, H., Leuphana Universität, L., Definition und Marktanalyse von Bürgerenergie in Deutschland, 
Bremen; Lüneburg. 
Truffer, B., 2003. User-led Innovation Processes: The Development of Professional Car Sharing by Environmentally 
Concerned Citizens. Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research 16 (2), 139-154. 
Tyler, T.R., Blader, S.L., 2001. Identity and Cooperative Behavior in Groups. Group Processes & Intergroup 
Relations 4 (3), 207-226. 
Walker, B.J.A., Wiersma, B., Bailey, E., 2014. Community benefits, framing and the social acceptance of offshore 
wind farms: An experimental study in England. Energy Research & Social Science 3 46-54. 
Walker, G., Devine-Wright, P., 2008. Community renewable energy: What should it mean? Energy Policy 36 (2), 497-
500. 
Walker, G., Devine-Wright, P., Hunter, S., High, H., Evans, B., 2010. Trust and community: Exploring the 
meanings, contexts and dynamics of community renewable energy. Energy Policy 38 (6), 2655-2663. 
Whitmarsh, L., O'Neill, S., 2010. Green identity, green living? The role of pro-environmental self-identity in 
determining consistency across diverse pro-environmental behaviours. Journal of Environmental Psychology 30 
(3), 305-314. 
Wüstenhagen, R., Menichetti, E., 2012. Strategic choices for renewable energy investment: Conceptual framework 
and opportunities for further research. Energy Policy 40 1-10. 
Yalçın-Riollet, M., Garabuau-Moussaoui, I., Szuba, M., 2014. Energy autonomy in Le Mené: A French case of 
grassroots innovation. Energy Policy  69 347-355. 
Yildiz, Ö., Rommel, J., Debor, S., Holstenkamp, L., Mey, F., Müller, J.R., Radtke, J., Rognli, J., 2015. Renewable 
energy cooperatives as gatekeepers or facilitators? Recent developments in Germany and a multidisciplinary 
research agenda. Energy Research & Social Science 6 (0), 59-73. 
Young, H.P., 2008. social norms, in: Durlauf, S.N., Blume, L.E. (Eds.), The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. 
Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke. 
35 
 
Acknowledgments 
I am grateful to two anonymous referees for valuable comments and suggestions. I also thank 
Cate Chapman for her linguistic revision of the present text. 
Appendix A 
Table A1. Item-total correlation and Cronbach’s alpha for the different scales. 
 Item-total 
correlation 
and 
Cronbach’s 
alpha 
Social identification  
1. I am proud to be part of the cooperative. 0.64 
2. I have a lot in common with the other members of the cooperative. 0.67 
3. Being a member of the cooperative is an important part of who I am. 0.72 
4. I feel attached to the other cooperative members.  0.70 
5. I like talking about the cooperative in the presence of others. 0.66 
Cronbach’s alpha 0.86 
Pro-environmental orientation  
1. I feel concerned about climate change. 0.63 
2. I think that human activities are one of the main causes of climate 
change. 
0.45 
3. I am the type of person who cares about ecology. 0.65 
4. I think of myself as an eco-responsible consumer. 0.68 
5. I want to feel that I personally contribute to the protection of the 
environment. 
0.68 
6. I like that my family or my friends see me as someone concerned by the 
environment 
0.57 
7. Make short distances on foot or by bike 0.44 
8. Avoid plastic bags in shops 0.45 
9. Reuse old plastic bags 0.48 
10. Buy fruit and vegetables grown locally rather than imported 0.40 
11. Turn off the tap while brushing my teeth 0.40 
Cronbach’s alpha 0.84 
Interpersonal trust  
1. Would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too 
careful in dealing with people? 
0.70 
2. Do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they 
got the chance, or would they try to be fair? 
0.66 
3. Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful or that they 
are mostly looking out for themselves? 
0.65 
Cronbach’s alpha 0.82 
Source: created by author. 
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Appendix B 
Figure B1. Relative frequencies of cooperative members’ motivations. 
Question: “To which extent each of the following elements has played a role in your 
decision to join the cooperative?” 
The production of renewable energy The return on investments 
  
The electricity price a The absence of charges for connection a 
  
The transparency of pricing a The influence of others’ advice 
  
Source: created by author based on survey (2014). 
a: as regards the sample of BeauVent members, only members who were supplied by Ecopower were considered. 
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